By Bokwe Mafuna - ADM MEDIA
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been caught in cycles of violence for decades. The resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23) since 2021 has reignited a complex conflict involving national rivalries, economic interests, and humanitarian disaster. In 2025, two overlapping peace efforts—direct talks in Doha and a broader agreement between the DRC and Rwanda—have offered cautious hope but also underscored the region’s deep fractures.
This article explores the main dynamics shaping the DRC–M23 negotiations, the drivers of conflict, and the prospects for peace.
A Fragile Breakthrough: The Doha Talks
In March 2025, Qatar initiated direct negotiations between Kinshasa and M23 representatives, a breakthrough after years of stalemate. On 23 April, the parties announced a tentative commitment to work towards a ceasefire and address core grievances.
Key goals of the Doha process:
-
Ceasefire in contested areas.
-
Confidence-building measures to de-escalate fighting.
-
A framework to tackle the root causes of conflict, including political exclusion and control of mineral-rich territories.
M23’s Executive Secretary Benjamin Mbonimpa emphasized:
“We believe in the Doha process. We are heading there to secure lasting peace.”
(Source: Deutsche Welle, April 2025)
However, the optimism was tempered by events on the ground. M23 had captured major cities such as Goma and Bukavu and established a parallel administration. The Congolese government, weakened by the withdrawal of foreign military allies, relied increasingly on local militias like the Wazalendo coalition to resist M23 advances (International Crisis Group, 2024).
The Washington Agreement: Parallel Diplomacy
In late June, a separate peace accord was signed in Washington, D.C., between the DRC and Rwanda, brokered by the United States. U.S. officials presented the deal as a “new chapter of hope and opportunity” for the Great Lakes region (White House statement, June 2025).
Key provisions of the Washington Agreement:
-
Phased withdrawal of Rwandan troops from eastern Congo.
-
Coordinated dismantling of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which Rwanda views as an existential threat.
-
Disarmament and vetting of all Congolese militias.
-
U.S. investment commitments tied to mining concessions in cobalt, coltan, and gold.
But the M23 was pointedly excluded. In a statement, M23-affiliated Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) coordinator Corneille Nangaa declared:
“Our problems are different from what was dealt with in Washington.”
(Source: Deutsche Welle, July 2025)
Analysts quickly noted that the exclusion of M23—now the most powerful rebel force—risked making the agreement unenforceable (International Crisis Group, “Congo’s M23 Crisis,” 2024).
Why the Conflict Persists
Experts point to a set of intertwined factors keeping the eastern DRC in turmoil.
1. Mutual Distrust and Maximalist Demands
M23 insists on political recognition, demilitarization of areas under its control, and implementation of previous agreements such as the 2013 Nairobi Deal (UN Security Council Report, S/2023/563). The government refuses to legitimize M23 or grant amnesty without disarmament.
Quote:
“The deadlock is predictable. Each side sees compromise as surrender,”
– Gonza Mugi, Kigali-based analyst (DW interview, July 2025).
2. Armed Mobilization
Both sides continue to expand their forces. The government has encouraged recruitment into Wazalendo militias. However, these groups are fragmented, indisciplined, and in some cases have cooperated with the FDLR, further blurring lines of allegiance (Congo Research Group, “Eastern Congo Militias,” 2024).
M23, meanwhile, has reportedly received continued material and logistical support from Rwanda (UN Group of Experts Report, December 2024).
3. National Political Competition
The crisis has become a platform for internal Congolese power struggles. President Félix Tshisekedi has relied on military recruitment and political repression to maintain authority. At the same time, former president Joseph Kabila has emerged as a critic, reportedly meeting AFC leadership in Goma and positioning himself as an alternative power center (Africa Confidential, June 2025).
“This conflict has become currency in Kinshasa politics,”
said Jean Baptiste Gasominari, Congolese analyst living in Rwanda (DW, July 2025).
4. Regional Rivalries
Rwanda and Uganda have long competed for influence in North and South Kivu. Uganda’s military deployment in Ituri is nominally targeting Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) insurgents, but also aims to counter Rwanda’s presence (ICG, “Uganda and Rwanda in the Congo,” 2023).
Kenya and Angola have tried mediating but remain divided over Rwanda’s role.
The Humanitarian Toll
Decades of fighting have caused immense suffering:
-
Over 120,000 Congolese fled to Uganda and Burundi in the first half of 2025 alone (UNHCR, May 2025).
-
Chronic food insecurity affects nearly 6 million people in eastern provinces (World Food Programme, 2024).
-
Sexual violence and forced recruitment remain widespread (Human Rights Watch, “DRC Abuses,” 2024).
While the Washington deal promised aid corridors and voluntary return programs, implementing them amid active conflict remains daunting.
Economics of Conflict and Peace
Eastern Congo’s mineral riches are central to both the conflict and peace efforts. As Mugi noted:
“You cannot do business where there is no peace.”
Both the DRC and Rwanda have economic incentives to stabilize trade routes and formalize mining contracts. However, Nobel laureate Denis Mukwege has criticized what he called “the reward of aggression,” warning the agreements risk legitimizing the plunder of Congolese resources (Le Monde, July 2025).
In Washington, President Trump’s remarks about securing “a lot of mineral rights” from the Congo fueled controversy over the U.S.’s motives (White House Press Briefing, June 2025).
Implementation: Will the Truces Hold?
Translating commitments into action faces significant obstacles.
Three main issues:
-
Monitoring and Verification
-
The Washington agreement established a joint monitoring mechanism.
-
But enforcement relies heavily on cooperation among the same states accused of fueling the conflict.
-
-
Justice and Accountability
-
Past atrocities committed by all sides remain largely unpunished.
-
Justice provisions are vague, with no clear role for the International Criminal Court.
-
Gasominari observed:
“Justice has been delegated to internal processes that lack credibility.” (DW, July 2025)
-
-
Exclusion of Key Stakeholders
-
The M23’s absence from the Washington deal leaves it unbound by its provisions.
-
Civil society and local communities were largely sidelined.
-
Rwanda’s Perspective: The FDLR Threat
Rwanda insists that peace depends on eliminating the FDLR—a militia formed partly by perpetrators of the 1994 genocide (International Crisis Group, 2023).
Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe stated:
“We will not accept any settlement that does not include the irreversible end of the FDLR.” (Rwandan Government Statement, June 2025)
This demand complicates negotiations, as elements of the Congolese army have tolerated or even cooperated with the FDLR as a counterweight to M23.
Uganda’s Role
Uganda’s intervention in North Kivu and Ituri is framed as a counterterrorism effort against the ADF. However, analysts say Kampala is also motivated by rivalry with Kigali (ICG, “Uganda and Rwanda in the Congo,” 2023).
Some regional leaders, such as Kenya’s President William Ruto, have been sympathetic to Rwanda’s security concerns. Others, including the European Union, have sanctioned Rwandan and M23 leaders, creating further fragmentation in diplomatic efforts.
M23’s Position After the Washington Accord
Despite their exclusion, M23 has maintained its military posture and continued negotiations in Doha.
“We are still attacked by Wazalendo and government coalitions,” Mbonimpa said. “We will defend our communities.”
(Source: Deutsche Welle, July 2025)
This stance underscores how divergent peace processes risk further entrenching the conflict.
The Role of the United States
The Biden administration (after Trump) continued supporting the Washington framework, linking mineral investments with security guarantees. But human rights groups have warned that such deals may prioritize economic interests over accountability (Human Rights Watch, 2025).
The United States has simultaneously reduced humanitarian aid funding, which previously covered 70% of assistance in the DRC (OCHA, 2025).
Learning from History
Analysts point to past agreements—especially the 2002 Sun City Accord—as examples of how elite bargains can end fighting temporarily but fuel longer-term instability if underlying issues are ignored (ICG, “Sun City’s Lessons,” 2012).
“Power sharing alone should never be the objective,” noted an Africa Confidential editorial in June 2025. “Without credible justice and local ownership, peace agreements simply set the stage for the next crisis.”
Outlook and Scenarios
Optimistic scenario:
-
Doha talks produce a comprehensive ceasefire with M23.
-
Rwanda cooperates in withdrawing troops and ending support to proxies.
-
Regional actors coordinate efforts to dismantle the FDLR.
-
U.S. investment helps rebuild infrastructure and livelihoods.
Pessimistic scenario:
-
Parallel negotiations collapse.
-
M23 resumes large-scale offensives.
-
Wazalendo militias fragment further.
-
Humanitarian conditions deteriorate.
-
Regional rivalries deepen.
Most likely scenario in the short term:
-
Limited ceasefire agreements hold sporadically.
-
Local skirmishes continue.
-
Political jockeying prevents full implementation of either Doha or Washington agreements.
Conclusion: A Long Road Ahead
Eastern Congo’s conflict is rooted in historical grievances, regional rivalries, and economic interests. While 2025 has brought unprecedented diplomatic engagement, the risks of failure remain high.
Meaningful peace will require:
-
Inclusive Congolese-led dialogue.
-
Justice for victims of atrocities.
-
Regional cooperation without proxy manipulation.
-
Transparency in economic deals.
As Jean Baptiste Gasominari put it:
“Without justice, the peace will be no more than a pause between wars.”
(DW, July 2025)
Sources
-
UN Group of Experts on the DRC, December 2024: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/panel-of-experts/reports
-
International Crisis Group (ICG), “Congo’s M23 Crisis,” 2024: https://www.crisisgroup.org
-
Africa Confidential, June 2025: https://www.africa-confidential.com
-
Deutsche Welle (DW) reporting, April–July 2025: https://www.dw.com
-
Human Rights Watch, “DRC Abuses,” 2024: https://www.hrw.org
-
UNHCR Refugee Updates, May 2025: https://www.unhcr.org
-
World Food Programme, 2024: https://www.wfp.org
-
Le Monde Interview with Denis Mukwege, July 2025: https://www.lemonde.fr
-
White House Press Briefings, June 2025: https://www.whitehouse.gov
-
Rwandan Government Statements, June 2025: https://www.gov.rw
You Must be Registered Or Logged in To Comment Log In?